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Judge Van Voorhis, the lone dissenter, appeared to be arguing not that a
variance should be granted, but that the applicants had an absolute right to build
the new station. The applicants had a "vested right in the prior use of the sub-
ject -:operty"; since it had been a gas station before the ordinance, it could con-
tinue to be one afterwards. And it could be remodeled, reconstructed, and
modernized if need be to keep up with modern needs. Otherwise, the owner
would be driven out of business by the necessity of maintaining his premises
in 1929 style for 1958 requirements. The successful businessman, whose in-
creased business required modernization and expansion would be held back,
whereas the failure might continue to operate an obsolete establishment so long
as he desired.
The dissent seems to miss the point entirely. The policy of the zoning
statutes being to discourage and eventually eliminate non-conforming uses,281
there is no inconsistency in holding that they may continue so long as they can
be used in the condition they are in but that they cannot be subsequently en-
larged or modernized by a basic structural change. The property interests of the
owner demand an exception as to his vested rights prior to the enactment of
the ordinance, but do not mean that he should be placed in a unique position of
being able to flout the statute in the future; the continuation of prior existing
non-conforming uses as of right is not to grant a perpetual monopoly to the land-
owner, but merely to avoid confiscation of his property before he has received
his return from prior vested interests. Actually, the request for a variance is in-
consistent with any theory of there being a right arising out of the prior existing
use.2 9 The variance is to be granted where no such right exists; if there is such
a right, no variance is necessary or should be granted.
As a matter of practicality, there appears to be no good reason why one
who is contemplating the destruction of an existing structure and the erection
of a new one should not be required to comply with the zoning ordinances just
as would one entering vacant land with initial construction in mind. This is all
the more clear after a case such as the Harbison decision30 has established that
a municipality may reasonably provide for the termination of a prior non-con-
forming use.
Authority of Town to Establish Park Within Village Limits
In Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntingtonal the town sought a
reversal of the Appellate Division's judgment that a 1955 statute authorizing it
28. Supra note 7.
29. National Lumber Products v. Ponzio, 133 N.J.L. 95, 42 A.2d 753 (1945).
30. Supra note 1.
31. 4 N.Y.2d 182, 173 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1958).
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to establish and operate public bathing beaches at any place within its boundaries 2
was invalid. The town had acquired lands in the village for the purpose of operat-
ing them as public bathing beaches, said land having been zoned by the village
for residential purposes only. The village attacked the constitutionality of the
1955 statute contending that it was a local law destroying the uniformity of
treatment which the Constitution guarantees.33 Despite this contention, reversal
was granted and the constitutionality of the statute was upheld, based on a finding
that the statute merely confirmed and clarified the existence of a power already
enjoyed by the town. The statute gave no added authority to the town nor did it
infringe on any right of the village and therefore could not be regarded as
violative of the Constitution.
Under section 220(4) of the Town Law, every town 'board throughout the
state is given blanket authority to establish public parks34-- and bathing beaches
are parks.35 Absent any restrictive or qualifying language within this section, it
cannot be said that the Legislature intended to prohibit a town from establishing
a public park within an incorporated village.36 Nor can it be said that section
198(4) of the -Town Law qualifies this authority by requiring the village's con-
sent prior to acquisition of land for "park purposes". that section, as both its
text and title make evident, deals solely with a "park district" park, a completely
different type of park from the town public park.37 After such an analysis, the
Court reasonably concluded that the town long before 1955 was authorized to
acquire lands within a village for use as a public beach without the consent of
the village.
Notwithstanding the general authority of the town to establish a beach, the
question arises whether a village ordinance limiting property to residential uses
supersedes this statutory provision. The Court decided that since the practical
effect of the ordinance was to exclude public parks and bathing beaches, it bore
no substantial relationship to zoning purposes.3 8 This being so, the ordinance was
stricken as void and ineffectual. This, of course, was no innovation in the in-
32. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955 ch. 840 §1.
33. See N. Y. CONST., Art.HI §17, which forbids the adoption of a local bill
incorporating villages.
34. See also N. Y. Town LAw 81(1) and N.Y. Sess. Laws 1906, ch. 87, later
amended N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 710, pt. 4, tit. 1, §4, which the Court also cited
as similar grants of authority to towns.
35. Cf. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, i63 N.E. 732 (1928).
36. See N. Y. TOWN LAW §§220(5) and 198(3) wherein the Legislature ex-
pressly provided that no dumping grounds were to be acquired or water pipes laid
within any village without the village's consent.
37. Compare Art. 12 with Art. 14 of N. Y. TOWN LAw.
38. N. Y. VILLAGE LAw §§175, 177. The Court considered this ordinance
similar to one forbidding erection of colleges or religious edifices and schools.
See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508,
154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
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terpretation and application of section 175 of the Village Law.39 The ordinance
being void, the Court could and did assert that the 1955 statute took nothing
from the village and effected no change or alteration in the village charter.
While the rationale of the Court is persuasive, the end result is that two
municipal corporations exist within the same territory exercising the se.ne
powers.40 This situation should be avoided for the practical consideration that
intolerable confusion instead of good government would attain in a territory in
which two corporations endeavor to function concurrently. 41
Home Rule, Public Authorifies
Under the Home Rule amendment to the state Constitution, the legislature
may not act by special law "in relation to the property, affairs or government
of any city" unless requested to do so by the city affected.42 In a leading case,43
however, the words "property, affairs or government' were held to have a "special,
legal significance"'4 4 and to have been adopted with "a Court of Appeals' definition,
not that of Webster's Dictionary."45  (The direction taken by this case, how-
ever, was not a new one.46 ) This definition has been a narrow one, allowing the
legislature wide latitude in dealing with local matters. Thus city transit,47
health,48 water supply"9 and sewage5" problems have been held suject to special
legislative action without benefit of a city message. The type of reasoning by
which such results have been achieved was shown at its most extreme where it
was said: "The statute affects the health and safety not only of the residents of
Rochester, but of persons temporarily there. It does not deal solely with the
'property, affairs or government' of Rochester."'
In the light of this judicial history it could come as no surprise when the
39. Long Island Univ. v. Tappan, 305 N.Y. 893. 114 N.E.2d 432 (1953); Con-
cordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 195-196, 93 N.E.2d 632, 635-636(1950).
40. Compare N.. Y. VILLAGE LAw §89(6) with N. Y. TOWN LAW §220(4).
41. 2 MCQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §7.08 (3d ed. 1949).
42. N. Y. CONST. Art. IX, §11.
43. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
44. Id. at 472, 167 N.E. at 706.
45. Id. at 473, 167 N.E. at 707.
46. See City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E.
836 (1929); McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922);
Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912).
47. Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York supra note 46; Salzman v.
Impelliteri, 203 Misc. 486, 124 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd 281 App. Div. 1023,
122 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1st Dep't ), aff'd 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953).
48. Adler v. Deegan, supra note 43.
49. Board of Supervisors of Ontario County v. Water Power & Control
Comm., 227, App.Div. 345, 238 N.Y.Supp. 55 (3d Dep't 1929).
50. Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
51. Board of Supervisors of Ontario County v. Water Power & Control
Comm., supra note 49.
